Abstract-In this paper, we analyze RFID authentication schemes designed to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability: the L-K and S-M schemes. We show how to trace tags in the L-K scheme without corrupting tags. We also show that if a standard cryptographic pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is used in the S-M scheme, then the scheme may fail to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability. To achieve the desired untraceability features, the S-M scheme can use a robust PRBG which provides forward security and backward security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automated object identification technology. An RFID system consists of RFID tags, RFID readers and a back-end server. A tag is a tiny microchip containing identification information. A reader queries a tag, receives responses from the tag via radio signal, and queries the backend server which maintains a database of tags. The server retrieves and returns to the reader the detailed information of the tag.
RFID tags are being deployed in many consumer, financial and governmental applications, for instance respectively in supply chain [5] , [18] , [28] , in contactless credit cards [9] , and in e-passports [12] , [10] , [14] .
RFID technology raises significant privacy issues. For example, since a tag automatically responds to queries via radio signal, sensitive data may be leaked to unauthorized readers. Even when the data is encrypted, the location of the tag may still be traced. There has been considerable research on these privacy issues and numerous privacy-reserving RFID authentication schemes have been proposed. For a survey, see [11] .
Some material on the L-K scheme in this work appeared in an extended abstract [22] .
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In view of the pervasiveness and inconspicuous nature of these tiny RFIDs, privacy for RFID tag users is a major concern that could potentially impede the public's long-term adoption of RFID-enabled applications. To the best of our knowledge, formal treatments of strong privacy for RFID protocols include the work of Avoine [1] , Juels and Weis [13] , Le, Burmester and de Medeiros [15] ; Vaudenay [29] , [30] , [23] and Lim and Kwon [16] . The difference in these models lie basically in the power of the adversary's tag-corruption ability with respect to the strong privacy notion.
Two strong privacy notions, termed backward untraceability and forward untraceability, were proposed in [19] and [16] (here we use the terminology from [16] ). Backward untraceability means that, if the adversary reveals the internal state of a tag at time τ , the adversary is not able to tell whether a transaction before time τ involves the tag. Forward untraceability means that, if the adversary reveals the internal state of a tag at time τ , the adversary is not able to tell whether a transaction after time τ + δ (for some δ > 0) involves the tag, provided that the adversary does not eavesdrop on the tag continuously after time τ .
A. Our Work
We analyze in this paper the privacy issues of the RFID authentication protocols designed to provide the strong privacy notions of backward and forward untraceability, namely the scheme by Lim and Kwon [16] at ICICS '06, and the scheme by Song and Mitchell [26] at WISEC '08. The L-K scheme is a nice unconventional design in the sense that it achieves both forward and backward untraceability in the face of tag corruption, while typical protocols only provide backward untraceability. That paper also defined a provable security model for backward and forward untraceability. The S-M scheme is designed to provide the same features as the L-K scheme, but with improved performance in memory space, computation time and communication overhead.
We give a privacy analysis of the L-K scheme with respect to a general untraceable privacy model detailed in Section II. We describe how to trace a tag within the L-K scheme even without requiring state corruption [13] , [29] , [16] , [15] , [30] , and discuss why the S-M scheme is resistant to this problem.
In both the L-K scheme and the S-M scheme, a tag needs to generate random numbers. When a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is used in a security protocol to generate random numbers, it is important to know whether a standard cryptographic PRBG suffices for the protocol or a robust PRBG is necessary. In some cases, a protocol designer may overlook the fact that a standard PRBG may not provide forward and backward security, which is necessary for certain properties of the protocol that it underlies.
In the same work [26] proposing the S-M scheme, the definition for a PRBG refers to the standard PRBG. In Section V, we show that if a standard PRBG is used in the schemes, then the schemes may fail to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability. We construct an example of a robust PRBG for the S-M scheme to ensure its desired untraceability features.
II. RFID PRIVACY MODELS
For completeness and for better clarity, we describe here the general untraceable privacy (UPriv) model [21] , [22] , [24] that will be the setting in which we use in later sections to demonstrate how to trace tags and thus show that the schemes do not achieve the notion of untraceable privacy.
In fact, the model defined herein can be seen as an alternative definition of the Juels-Weis model [13] in a style more in line with the Bellare et al. [4] models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, for which RFID protocols can be seen to have close relationship with. With this model as a reference, our emphasis throughout this paper is on the analysis of the privacy (or security) issues of recent RFID protocols.
A protocol party is a T ∈ T ags or R ∈ Readers interacting in protocol sessions as per the protocol specifications until the end of the session upon which each party outputs Accept if it feels the protocol has been normally executed with the correct parties. Adversary A controls the communications between all protocol parties (tag and reader) by interacting with them as defined by the protocol, formally captured by A's ability to issue queries of the following form:
• Execute(R, T , i) query. This models passive attacks, where adversary A gets access to an honest execution of the protocol session i between R and T by eavesdropping.
• Send(U 1 , U 2 , i, m) query. This query models active attacks by allowing the adversary A to impersonate some reader U 1 ∈ Readers (resp. tag U 1 ∈ T ags) in protocol session i and send a message m of its choice to an instance of some tag U 2 ∈ T ags (resp. reader U 2 ∈ Readers). This query subsumes the TagInit and ReaderInit queries as well as challenge and response messages in the Juels-Weis model. • Corrupt(T , K) query. This query allows the adversary A to learn the stored secret K of the tag T ∈ T ags, and which further sets the stored secret to K. It captures the strong privacy notions of backward untraceability (a.k.a. forward privacy) or forward untraceability depending on the time at which this query is allowed. Both notions measure the extent of the damage caused by the compromise of the tag's stored secret. This query is the equivalent of the SetKey query of the Juels-Weis model.
This query is the only query that does not correspond to any of A's abilities or any real-world event. This query allows to define the indistinguishability-based notion of untraceable privacy (UPriv). If the party has accepted and is being asked a Test query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given T b from the set {T 0 , T 1 }. Informally, A succeeds if it can guess the bit b. In order for the notion to be meaningful, a Test session must be fresh in the sense of Definition 2. Definition 1 (Session Completion): We say that a reader instance R j and a tag instance T i are partners if, and only if, both have output Accept(T i ) and Accept(R j ) respectively, signifying the completion of the protocol session.
Definition 2 (Freshness): A party instance is fresh at the end of execution if, and only if, 1) it has output Accept with or without a partner instance, 2) both the instance and its partner instance (if such a partner exists) have not been sent a Corrupt query. Definition 3 (Untraceable Privacy (UPriv)): UPriv is defined using the game G played between a malicious adversary A and a collection of reader and tag instances. A runs the game G whose setting is as follows.
Phase 1 (Learning): A can send any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries.
Phase 2 (Challenge): 1. At some point during G, A will choose a fresh session on which to be tested and send a Test query corresponding to the test session. Note that the test session chosen must be fresh in the sense of Definition 2. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given a tag T b from the set {T 0 , T 1 }. 2. A continues making any Execute, Send, and
Corrupt queries at will, subjected to the restrictions that the definition of freshness described in Definition 2 is not violated. Phase 3 (Guessing): Eventually, A terminates the game simulation and outputs a bit b , as its guess of the value of b. The success of A in winning G and thus breaking the notion of UPriv is quantified in terms of A's advantage in distinguishing whether A receives T 0 or T 1 , i.e. it correctly guessing b. This is denoted by Adv
where k is the security parameter. In relation to other models, note that the Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model [15] similarly allows the corruption of tags.
The Vaudenay model [29] , [30] is stronger than both the Juels-Weis and Le-Burmester-de Medeiros models in terms of the adversary's corruption ability. In more detail, it is stronger than the Juels-Weis model in the sense that it allows corruption even of the two tags used in the Challenge phase. It is stronger than the Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model in the sense that it considers all its privacy notions even for corrupted tags, in contrast to the Le-Burmester-de Medeiros model that only considers corruption for its forward privacy notion.
We chose to describe our tracing attacks in later sections with reference to a defined model in order for more uniformity between similar attacks on different RFID protocols, and for better clarity to illustrate how an adversary can circumvent the protocols using precise types of interactions that he exploits, as captured by his oracle queries. This will facilitate the task of a designer when an attempt is made to redesign a protocol which had been attacked.
III. THE RFID SCHEMES

A. The L-K Scheme
At ICICS '06, Lim and Kwon [16] proposed an RFID protocol that offers untraceable privacy (UPriv) both before and after tag corruption. This is a major feat, since other existing RFID schemes are only able to treat backward untraceability, i.e. a corrupted tag cannot be linked to any past completed sessions.
The initialization phase is as follows: 1) The reader chooses a random secret K i for each tag T i ; it evaluates m − 1 evolutions of
After initialization, a normal protocol session is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where f is a pseudorandom function. Refer to [16] for further details.
B. The S-M Scheme
We briefly recall the S-M scheme proposed at WISEC '08 [26] . f k () is a keyed hash function with key k. h() is a hash function. x y denotes the operation that right rotate-shifts x by y bits and x y denotes the operation that left rotate-shifts x by y bits. l is the length of the parameters in the scheme.
For each tag T i , the reader R stores its identifier (u i , t i ). u i is a unique secret for T i and t i = h(u i ). The value t i is stored in T i . An authentication session takes place as follows.
1) The R sends a random challenge r 1 to
). R also updates u i and t i as follows:
. To perform the above protocol, a tag needs to generate random numbers. [26] cites a definition for pseudorandom bit generators (PRBGs) which is just a standard PRBG; see Section V for details of why this definition is an issue.
Reader R Tag Ti Database: {. . . , (Ki, tables L1, L2), . . . } Secret: wi,T , ci, Ki pick r1 r1||r2) ) and check that σ 1 = σ1. calculate σ2 = f (K i , r2||r1) ⊕ wi,S.
If yes:
update Ki = g(Ki). 
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS A. Tracing the Tag in the L-K Scheme
For the purpose of understanding our attack, it suffices to review the gist of the L-K scheme. The tag updates its stored secret K i in two possible ways. If the reader is successfully authenticated, it would update as K i = g(K i ⊕ (w i,T ||r 1 ||r 2 )). Otherwise, the tag would update it as K i = g(K i ), up to m unsuccessful authentications, after which the tag stops updating its K i . This eventual non-updating allows the reader to catch up.
Our attack works nevertheless, as follows, using the basic principle where we intentionally desynchronize the tag from the reader by sending the tag into the future [16] . 1) Learning: An adversary sends m queries r j 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m to the tag T 0 , and records the tag's response t j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Since the adversary is impersonating the reader, thus each time it will not pass the check by the tag, and so each time the tag would update its stored secret as K i = g(K i ), from which t i will be derived in the next session. 2) Challenge: Query r m 1 to the tag T b ∈ {T 0 , T 1 }, and obtain its response t * . 3) Guess: Check if t * = t m . If so, then the adversary knows this was the tag it queried during the Learning phase, i.e., T b = T 0 . Otherwise, it knows that T b = T 1 . It was remarked in [16] that once a tag is successfully authenticated by a reader, then the tag's stored secret K i would be freshly randomized so that tracing of any kind is prevented. Yet, the fact is that even after that point, our adversary can repeat the above attack step of the Learning phase by sending m arbitrary queries r j 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m to the tag again to desynchronize it and the same tracing attack applies. This attack can be performed after every successful tag-to-reader authentication.
In order to solve the DoS problem, the designers included into the design a feature that unfortunately allows our attack causing the tag to be traceable even without corruption, although the goal for their protocol was much stronger, i.e., backward and forward untraceability even with corruption.
In contrast, we remark that the S-M scheme does not exhibit this problem because the transmitted messages M 1 , M 2 , M 3 are randomized by the ephemeral random value r 2 which is itself not publicly transmitted. This is in contrast to the L-K scheme where the transmitted t i is a deterministic function of the stored secret K i , the latter of which is no longer updated after m unsuccessful authentication attempts.
V. STRONG PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Random bit generation is very important in cryptography. However, true random bit generators rely on physically random processes, and hence they are inefficient or expensive in most practical environments. It is therefore more common to use pseudorandom bit generators (PRBG) in practice.
A. Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PRBG)
A standard (cryptographic) PRBG is a deterministic algorithm which, when given a truly random binary input of length n, outputs a binary sequence of length polynomial in n, say p(n), which "appears" to be random. The input to the PRBG is called the seed, the output of the PRBG is called a pseudorandom bit sequence. A standard PRBG is secure, if when given the first l < p(n) bits of the PRBG's output, it is infeasible in polynomial time (in n) to predict the next bit of the output ( [17] , [27] ).
A robust PRBG provides additional security beyond a standard PRBG. In [2] , Barak et al propose a formal model and an architecture for robust PRBG, which satisfy the following properties of forward security and backward security 1 : (1) backward security: past output of the PRBG looks random to an adversary, even if the adversary learns the internal state at a later time.
(2) forward security: future output of the PRBG looks random to an adversary with knowledge of the current state, provided that the PRBG is later refreshed with data of sufficient entropy. Similar properties and constructions can be found in [3] from NIST.
One example of standard PRBG is a block cipher with a secret key working in counter mode, i.e., let E k () be a block encryption scheme with secret key k, the output is s i = E k (i), i = 1, 2, · · · . Such a PRBG is a standard PRBG if the block cipher is secure, but it is not a robust PRBG.
Another example of standard PRBG is a keyed hash function with a secret key in output-feedback mode. Let h k () be a keyed hash function with secrete key k and an initial input s 0 , the output is s i+1 = h k (s i ), i = 0, 1, · · · . Such a PRBG is not a robust PRBG, either.
B. Forward Untraceability
We review forward untraceability as defined in [16] and [26] : at time τ during the Learning phase, the adversary reveals the internal state of the tag T i via the Corrupt query. At time τ > τ , the tag performs a transaction with the server and the adversary does not eavesdrop on this transaction. Forward untraceability means that the adversary cannot tell if a transaction at time τ > τ involves the tag T i .
We show that, if the PRBG used by the tag is not a robust PRBG, then the scheme does not achieve forward untraceability. To be concrete, we assume the block cipher based PRBG described in Section V-A. Suppose at time τ , the adversary reveals the internal state of a tag, including its value t i and the internal state of its PRBG.
At some time τ > τ during the Challenge phase, the tag has a transaction without being eavesdropped by the adversary. After time τ and still during the Challenge phase, the adversary observes multiple transaction messages via Execute queries.
Given the internal state (k and i) of the PRBG that the adversary obtained at time τ , the adversary can compute a sequence of n future outputs of the PRBG, where n is an upper bound on the maximum number of times that the tag could have invoked its PRBG since time τ . If any value r in this sequence and any observed message (r 1 , M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) after τ satisfies f M1⊕r (r 1 ⊕r) = M 2 , then the adversary can deduce that the message involves the tag T i . In addition to identifying the tag, the adversary can further compute the t i used in the observed transaction as well as the updated t i after this transaction:
, and updated
. Therefore, the adversary can launch more attacks, e.g., to impersonate the tag or clone the tag.
C. Backward Untraceability
We review backward untraceability as defined in [16] and [26] : at time τ , the adversary reveals the internal state of the tag T i . Backward untraceability means that the adversary cannot tell if a transaction at time τ < τ involves the tag T i .
Given the internal state (k and i) of the PRBG that the adversary obtained at time τ , the adversary can compute a sequence of i previous outputs of the PRBG. The adversary has also observed multiple transactions before time τ . If any r value in the computed output sequence and any observed message (r 1 , (M 1 , M 2 ), M 3 ) satisfies f M1⊕r (r 1 ⊕r) = M 2 , then it can deduce that the message involves the tag T i .
D. Using Robust PRBG in the S-M Scheme
It is clear that, for the S-M scheme to achieve forward untraceability and backward untraceability, the PRBG used in the tags needs to be a robust PRBG, i.e. forward secure and backward secure. We can follow the construction in [2] or [3] to build a robust PRBG for the tags. An example of a robust PRBG is based on a block cipher working in counter mode. Let k be the secret key. Each time the PRBG is invoked, s = E k (i) is outputted as the random bits, the key is updated as k = E k (i + 1), and the counter i increases. The PRBG also refreshes its key as k = k ⊕ r 1 each time a random challenge r 1 is received from the reader. Now we briefly analyze the case when k and i are revealed at time τ . First we consider backward traceability.
If E is a secure block cipher, then it is infeasible to find the previous keys it used; without the previous keys, it is infeasible to distinguish its previous output from a random number. Therefore backward untraceability of the schemes is preserved.
Next we consider forward traceability. Suppose in a certain transaction after τ , the adversary does not observe the messages, including r 1 . Then the adversary does not know the updated key and thus he cannot predict the future outputs of E. Therefore, forward untraceability of the schemes is preserved.
Remark. We note that the backward security of the robust PRBG is sufficient but not necessary for the backward untraceability of the S-M scheme. Suppose the PRBG based on keyed hash function given in Section V-A is used in the S-M scheme. Given s i and k at time τ , the adversary can tell if a given value x was generated by the PRBG by computing
, · · · and checking if s i appears in the sequence. Therefore, this PRBG does not provide backward security. But given s i and k at time τ , the adversary cannot compute any previous output of the PRBG; thus the backward traceable attack described above for a block cipher based PRBG does not work for the keyed hash based PRBG. However, we note that that the L-K scheme in [16] does need a robust PRBG to ensure its backward untraceability because the output of the PRBG is sent in plaintext.
Remark. The S-M scheme does not provide backward untraceability during the period from its last successful authentication session to its compromising even when a robust PRBG is used. Suppose at time τ the adversary queried a tag and collected the messages r 1 , M 1 , and M 2 . Then at time τ the adversary compromised the tag and obtained its t i value. If between time τ and time τ , the tag did not interact with an authentic reader, then it did not update the t i value. The adversary can check if M 2 = f ti (r 1 ⊕ M 1 ⊕ t i ). If it is true, then the adversary can conclude that the messages collected at time τ involves the tag compromised at time τ .
VI. CONCLUSION
We analyzed RFID authentication schemes designed to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability. To this end, we described in an alternative manner the privacy models that capture untraceable privacy (UPriv) notion. Against this background, we showed how to trace tags in the L-K scheme, without requiring to corrupt tags.
Further, we showed that if a standard PRBG is used in the S-M scheme, then the scheme may fail to provide forward untraceability and backward untraceability. To achieve these untraceability features, the scheme can use a robust PRBG which provides forward security and backward security.
In some sense, these results support the case [6] , [7] , [8] that while provable security is the right approach to design and analysis of protocols, more careful analysis and interpretation of provable security models and proofs are needed to ensure the right definitions [25] and underlying assumptions are put in place. As a commonly accepted model addressing privacy and security in RFID has to be established and many RFID protocols are proposed without providing any formal security proof, these results strengthen the need for such a model to facilitate better design of RFID protocols that offer both privacy and security.
